Although I am moving all of my content to my new blog, and have therefore taken all postings off here to avoid cross-confusion, I have decided that it is best to keep the below article up due to it's being heavily cited. I don't want those citing it to have broken links on their pages.
Matthew Mainen
While Saudi Arabia’s involvement in suppressing Bahrain’s uprising is well documented, it’s behind the scenes role in Syria’s rebellion and Kuwaiti turmoil demonstrates that the monarchy seeks Arab-Islamic rather than Gulf hegemony. The collapse of the Syrian regime would albeit serve as the final blow to Iran’s quest for Mideast dominance, leaving Saudi Arabia the sole superpower. These prospects are troubling, given Saudi Arabia’s singular role in promoting Islamic extremism and its go-to move of creating sectarian tension.
For long it appeared that Iran was gaining the upper hand. By the end of 2008, Iraq’s Saudi-supported Sunni insurgency was defeated and Iraq’s Iranian backed Shia-majority asserted territorial control. In early January, Lebanon’s unity government collapsed, making Hezbollah a kingmaker. Then, on February 17th, Bahrain’s Shia majority, along with equally disgruntled Sunnis, rose up against the Sunni monarchy, presenting Iran with the perfect opportunity to attempt to backdoor into the Arab world.
Saudi Arabia acted swiftly, leading a contingent of over 2,000 Gulf troops to quell the uprising, but seeing a perfect opportunity to gain the initiative, Saudi Arabia went beyond Bahrain. Saudi affiliated members of Kuwait’s parliament, on the behest Saudi Arabia, called for a vote of no confidence on Kuwaiti Prime Minister Nasser Mohammed Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, who has good relations with Iran.
Pro-Saudi MPs such as Waleed al-Tabtabaie have called for political union with Saudi Arabia. While Kuwait is a Sunni majority state, it has a large and disenfranchised Shia minority. The second they protest for equality, and they eventually will, the calls for unification will grow louder as Saudi troops will be invited to “secure” Kuwait from an “Iranian plot.”
Already, Saudi Arabia and their Kuwait protégés are constructing a unified foreign policy, which is first emerging in Syria. Saudi Arabia took the role as the lead foreign funder for the Istanbul Syrian opposition conference, while coordinating with private Kuwaiti citizens and sympathetic MPs as they hosted fundraisers.
Saudi based Syrians have been given a free hand to criticize the government and organize in anti-Syrian regime activities, a sign of official approval given that Saudi-based Egyptian opposition activists were expelled. Not surprisingly, such activists found a similar fate in Kuwait.
On the ground, Saudi Arabia and its Kuwaiti supporters are engaged in a joint hearts and mind campaign in the Turkish refugee camps. This is not a humanitarian gesture as evidenced by the fact that Saudi officials have not visited a single legitimate refugee camp elsewhere in the Muslim world. Rather, it’s an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to rally Syria’s Sunni majority against the country’s Alawite rulers, all the while Kuwait and the other Gulf states sans Qatar play second fiddle.
Using Saudi-owned television stations, the monarchy has opened the airwaves to carefully selected Sunni Syrian clerics. Adnan al-Arour, for example, has called on his Sunni counterparts to “grind the Alawites and feed them to the dogs.” His calls were recently answered, with Sunni-Alawite clashes in Homs.
These relatively small sectarian clashes are a precursor to what further Saudi involvement entails. A fullscale ethnic conflict has the potential of mirroring the Iraqi civil conflict, especially because what the Alawite minority lacks in numbers they make up for in arms and military training. This is to say nothing, of the possibility of Syria being flooded with Saudi-born jihadists as was the case in Iraq.
Prince Nayef, Saudi Arabia’s de facto crown prince, played a decisive operational role in Iraq’s Sunni insurgency, sending prominent terrorists such as Abdullah al-Rashoud to Iraq. His son has played a similar role. The clerical establishment also involved itself throughout the insurgency by collecting funds and even issuing a fatwa calling on Muslims to join the jihad in Iraq.
The United States cannot sit on the sidelines as Saudi Arabia helps shape Syria’s future. Regime change is desirable. Saudi-sponsored regime change is not. As things stand now, the most active Syrian opposition figures are Saudi-sympathizers. A progressive and democratic Syria aligned with the United States will do the most to contain Iran, not a Saudi proxy.
Under U.S. guidance, Qatar, which has played a prominent role in shaping events in Libya, should take the initiative from Saudi Arabia by funding and assembling progressive opposition leaders. While influencing Syria’s future, the U.S. will avoid accusations of meddling so long as Qatar does the groundwork. This will allow for a controlled Syrian transition, a contained Saudi-Iranian conflict and renewed U.S. influence in the region.
By Matthew Mainen
